B M T diki Xitayning Kishilik Hoquq Weziyitige Qarap Chiqish Yighini Heqqide Jiddiy Inkaslar Otturigha Chiqti

2018-11-07
Un Flag

Grunge flag of United nations image is overlaying a detailed grungy texture

Birleshken döletler teshkilatida échilghan xitayning kishilik hoquq xatirisini “Qerellik körüp chiqish” yighinida xitay wekilliri Xitay hökümitining Uyghuristan xelqi üstidin yürgüziwatqan erqiy we kultural qirghinchiliqliri sewebidin Gheriptiki Amerika qatarliq demokrattik dewletlerning küchlük bésimigha duch keldi .
2018-Yili 6-noyabir, jenwe.

 webtv.un.org

Chet’eldiki kishilik hoquq pa’aliyetchiliri we Uyghur teshkilatliri uzundin buyan kütüp kelgen b d t diki xitayning kishilik hoquq weziyitige qarap chiqish yighini tünügün, yeni 6-noyabir küni échildi.

Yighinda gherbtiki amérika, en’gliye, awstraliye qatarliq démokratik döletlerdin 24 hökümet Uyghur we tibetning hazirqi weziyitini tilgha alghan bolup, buning ichide az dégende 14 dölet lagér mesilisini otturigha qoyghan. Halbuki, héchbir musulman döliti xitayning kishilik hoquq depsendichilikini tilgha almighan. Ular xitayning namratliqni tügitish siyasiti heqqide tejribe almashturushni telep qilghan we xitayning kishilik hoquq jehette qolgha keltürgen atalmish netijilirige utuqlarni tiligen.

Mezkur yighindin melum bolushiche, gherb elliridin amérika we awstraliye Uyghur rayonidiki Uyghurlarning köplep tutqun qilinishi we hemme yerni qaplighan éghir teqib sistémisini qattiq eyibligen chaghda, xitay hökümiti bu xil eyibleshlerni “Emeliyettin bekla yiraqlap ketken” dep teswirligen. Uningdin bashqa xitay tashqi ishlar ministirining mu’awin ministiri lé yüchéngmu buninggha ipade bildürüp: “Biz bir tereplime qarashta bolidighan we pakitni közge ilmaydighan bezi döletlerning eyibleshlirini qet’iy qobul qilmaymiz,” dégen.

Yighin axirlashqandin kéyin kishilik hoquqni közitish teshkilati xitay bölümining diréktori sofiy richardson xanim Uyghur weziyitining bezi döletler teripidin tilgha élinishi we élinmasliqi heqqidiki tesiratlirini bayan qilip, mundaq dédi: “Bu bir hem yaxshi hem nachar netije boldi. Peqet qismen döletlerningla shinjang weziyitini tilgha élishni xalaydighanliqini körduq. Beziliri qet’iyla bu toghriliq gep qilishni xalimaydiken. Tünügün eger musulman döletler shinjang weziyitini we shu yerdiki Uyghur musulmanlirining hazirqi ehwalini alahide otturigha qoyghan bolsa bek yaxshi bolatti. Türkiye ‘az sanliq milletler’ dep siypap ötüp ketken bolsimu, emma ‘Uyghur’ yaki ‘shinjang’ dep alahide tilgha almidi.”

Mezkur yighin axirlishishi bilenla bügün dunya Uyghur qurultiyi bayanat élan qilip, Uyghur diyaridiki jaza lagérlirining derhal taqilishini telep qildi. Bayanatta 2013-yilidiki xitayning kishilik hoquq weziyitige qarap chiqish yighinidin kéyin Uyghurlarning kishilik hoquq weziyitining künsayin nacharlishishqa qarap yüzlen’genliki, bolupmu diniy erkinlikning téximu qattiq kontrol qilin’ghanliqi alahide tilgha élin’ghan.

Melum bolghinidek, tünügün birleshken döletler teshkilatining aldida Uyghur, tibet, mongghul, wiyétnam, xitay xristi’an dini muritliridin teshkillen’gen mingdin artuq adem lagérlargha solan’ghan mehbuslarni qoyup bérishni telep qilip namayish ötküzgen idi. Mezkur bayanatta namayishning tepsilatighimu orun bérilgen.

Dunya Uyghur qurultiyining re’isi dolqun eysa ependi tünügünki namayishta sözligen nutqida nöwettiki Uyghurlar yoluquwatqan dehshetlik basturushni heqiqiy tilgha alghan döletler sanining yenila intayin azliqini bildürdi.

D u q ning programma yétekchisi pétér irwin ependi tünügünki yighindin öz oylighandek netije chiqqan-chiqmighanliqi heqqide ziyaritimizni qobul qilip, özliri texmin qilghan döletlerning Uyghur mesilisini otturigha qoyghanliqidin memnun bolghanliqini bildürdi.

U yene mundaq dédi: “Tünügünki yighinda 24 dölet Uyghurlarning omumiy weziyitini otturigha qoydi. Az dégende 14 dölet lagérlar mesilisini alahide tilgha aldi. 125 Din artuq dölet Uyghur mesilisini qet’iy tilgha almidi. Az dégende bir milyondin artuq Uyghur we qazaqning jaza lagérigha solinishi keskin téma boluwatqan mezgilde bu mesilining tünügünkidek yighinlarda tilgha élinmasliqi, bolupmu islam ellirining qet’iyla awaz chiqarmasliqi ademni bekla ümidsizlendüridighan ish bolup qaldi.”

Sofiy richardson xanimmu bu nuqtida öz köz-qarishini bayan qilip mundaq dédi: “Biz oylighan bezi mesililer yighinda tilgha élinmidi. Mesilen, biz xitaydiki ölüp ketken kishilik hoquq qoghdighuchilirining sanini békitip chiqqan iduq. Shinjang mesilisi tilgha élin’ghan bolsimu, lékin bu mesile jiq döletler teripidin otturigha qoyulmidi.”

Axirida pétir irwin Uyghur diyaridiki lagérlarning taqilishigha qarita bundin kéyinki tirishchanliqlarni tehlil qilip, mundaq dédi: “Lagérlarni taqash heqqide xitaygha bésim ishlitishte xitayning kishilik hoquq weziyitige qarap chiqish yighini yaxshi bir tallash, emma bu yéterlik emes. Méningche, amérika hökümitining kishilik hoquq depsendichilikide belgilik rol oynighan xitay emeldarlirigha qollanmaqchi bolghan ‘magnétsikiy qanuni’ mu yaxshi ünüm hasil qilalaydu. Uningdin bashqa yene b d t ning herxil yighinlirida awazimizni téximu ünlük qoyuwétip kishilik hoquq depsendichilikini muhim nuqta qilishimiz kérek. Biz musulman döletliridin köprek awaz chiqishini xalaymiz.”

Yuqiriqi nuqtida sofiy richardson xanimmu pikir bayan qilip, Uyghur mesilisini tilgha alghan döletlerning birliship béyjinggha lagérlarni taqash heqqide bésim ishlitishi lazimliqini bildürdi. U munularni bildürdi: “Méningche, tünügünki yighinda shinjang mesilisini alahide tilgha alghan 14 dölet birliship béyjing da’irilirige lagérni taqash heqqide bésim ishlitishi aqilane bir tallash. Xitayning nöwettiki b d t tiki küchige nisbeten bu belkim bekmu qiyin bolushi mumkin. Biraq mushu döletlerning musteqil bir yerge kélelishi ré’al we emeliyetchan ish. Bularning qilidighan ishi b d t kishilik hoquq aliy komissaridin Uyghur diyarida tekshürüshte bolushni telep qilish.” sada

Munir Yérzin : Delilqan Sugurbayéf Axmetjan Qasimini Hörmet Qilatti we Rehberlikige Boysunatti

2018-11-08
Tarixchi munir yerzin soz sozlimekte. 2017-Yil 19-oktebir, almata, qazaqistan.

Tarixchi munir yerzin soz sozlimekte. 2017-Yil 19-oktebir, almata, qazaqistan.

 RFA/Oyghan

Hazir qazaqistanning almuta shehiride yashawatqan 91 yashliq tarixiy shahit munir yérzin ependi özining 1947-1949-yilliri ghuljida neshr qilin’ghan “Inqilabi sherqiy türkistan” gézitide ishlesh jeryanida körgen-bilgenlirini bayan qildi. U, eslimisining bügünki dawamida 1946-yili, 7-ayda gerche, gomindang bilen sherqiy türkistan jumhuriyiti hökümiti arisidiki tinchliq bitimi boyiche birleshme hökümet qurulghan bolsimu, lékin xelqning “Sherqiy türkistan jumhuriyiti” dégen namni dawamliq qolliniwergenlikini, ili, tarbaghatay we altaydin ibaret azad üch wilayetning héchqachan gomindang hökümitige boysunmay öz musteqilliqini saqlighanliqini bayan qildi.

Munir yérzinning eslishiche, 1947-yili 10-ayda osman baturning ili hökümitige qarshi isyani bésiqturulup, altay qayturuwélinip, delilqan sugurbayéf waliyliqqa teyinlen’gendin kéyin u “Inqilabi sherqiy türkistan” gézitining muxbiri süpitide altaygha ewetilgen. Uni delilqan sugurbayéf qizghin qarshi alghan.

Munir yérzin ependining eslishiche, delilqan sugurbayéf milliy armiyening shimaliy front qomandanliq we altay waliyliqi wezipisige teyinlen’gen bolup, u exmetjan qasimining orunlashturushi we buyruqini ijra qilatti. U, exmetjan qasimini nahayiti hörmet qilatti. Général mayor delilqan sugurbayéf ürümchidiki gomindang herbiy da’irilirining altay we bashqa jaylardiki qazaqlarni Uyghurlargha qarshi qoyush, altayni osman batur arqiliq sherqiy türkistan inqilabi hökümitidin parchilash taktikisini tarmar qilishqa hesse qoshqan shexs idi.

1947-Yilidin bashlap xitay gomindang hökümiti terep azad üch wilayetni iqtisadiy jehettin qamal qilish, siyasiy jehettin muqimsizlashturush siyasitini qollan’ghan bolup, osman batur isyani üch wilayetning iqtisadigha éghir tesir körsetken. Exmetjan qasimi bashchiliqidiki inqilabi hökümet pütün imkaniyet bilen üch wilayetning, jümlidin altayning iqtisadiy ehwalini yaxshilashqa tirishqan. Netijide, ili, tarbaghataydiki xelq turmushi xitay gomindang hökümranliqidiki yette wilayettikige qarighanda alahide yaxshilan’ghan.

Munir yérzin ependi 1949-yili, 7-ayda altaydin qaytip kélip, shu yilining axirighiche” Inqilabi sherqiy türkistan” gézitide ishligen. Bu gézit xitay kompartiyesi Uyghur élini igiligendin kéyin emeldin qalghan we “Ili géziti” ge özgertilgen. Munir yérzin ependi 1950-yillarda sowét ittipaqigha köchüp ketken bolup, shuningdin tartip almutada Uyghur we ottura asiya xelqliri tarixi tetqiqati bilen shughullan’ghan.

Tepsilatini töwendiki ulinishtin anglang. ümidwar

China Authorities Detain Prominent Uyghur Philanthropist

2018-11-05
Nurtay Hajim talks with students at the Nurtay Iskender School for Orphans in Ghulja city, in an undated photo.

Nurtay Hajim talks with students at the Nurtay Iskender School for Orphans in Ghulja city, in an undated photo.

 Photo courtesy of an RFA listener

Authorities in northwest China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) have detained a well-known Uyghur philanthropist who housed the children of political prisoners, according to sources that said he may have been sentenced to nearly two decades in jail.

Nurtay Hajim, who is in his 60s, amassed a fortune through an international tourism and shipping firm he set up shortly after China expanded trade relations with the nations of Central Asia in the early 1990s.

According to a report published on China’s Sina.com, Hajim invested 3.8 million yuan (U.S. $548,700) in 2007 to launch the Nurtay Iskender School for Orphans, which offers free accommodation, food and education for 150 Uyghur children whose parents have died and other kids who lack guardians, from across the XUAR.

The businessman, who is admired in the Uyghur community for his generosity, has provided an annual donation of some 1.15 million yuan (U.S. $166,000) to the school to cover the costs of its students.

A Uyghur source from the XUAR recently told RFA’s Uyghur Service that Hajim had been taken into custody by local authorities shortly after returning to Ili Kazakh (in Chinese, Yili Hasake) Autonomous Prefecture’s Qorghas (Huocheng) county from a business trip to neighboring Kazakhstan.

“I saw him in April, when he drove across the Qorghas border into our homeland,” said the source, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

“Not long after he returned to our country, he was detained.”

The source said that Hajim’s family was never informed of his detention, and knew nothing of his whereabouts, although a rumor began to circulate in June that he had been sentenced to prison.

“I heard that he was escorted to his trial with a chain around his neck like a dog and was given an 18-year prison sentence,” the source said.

“I contacted his family to find out more information, but none of them dared to speak to me or to reveal anything.”

An officer at the Harambagh district police station, in Ili Kazakh’s Ghulja (Yining) city, told RFA that Hajim had been arrested by authorities from neighboring Ili River district, where the Nurtay Iskender School for Orphans is located.

When asked how many years in prison Hajim had been sentenced to, the officer said his department “cannot give you that information.”

The Nurtay Iskender School for Orphans “has been closed down,” he added.

The officer refused to comment when asked whether Hajim had been sentenced because his school had accepted the children of Uyghurs who were serving time in jail, and deferred further questions about the businessman’s case to the Ili River district police station.

However, an officer at the Ili River district police station told RFA that the Tash Koruk district police station was responsible for Hajim’s case, before passing the phone to his supervisor.

When asked whether Hajim had been sentenced, the supervisor said the trial took place “four months ago,” but was unable to provide further details.

The supervisor noted that 74 Uyghur businessmen had been tried in Ghulja city in recent months, but said he was unaware whether the cases were related to each other or to that of Hajim.

Philanthropists targeted

Last month, sources told RFA that authorities had shuttered all branches of the popular Miraj Restaurant in the XUAR capital Urumqi because it promoted Uyghur cultural identity after the detention in May of owner Abdureshit Hoshur Haji, his brother Ablimit Hoshur Halis Haji—a prominent philanthropist—and two of Hoshur Haji’s business partners for their purported ties to a Uyghur education fund.

Halis Haji, the source said, was detained because of his establishment in 1994 of the Halis Foundation, a charitable organization whose goal was to help elite Uyghur students attain higher education and financial aid for study abroad.

The Halis Foundation was initially viewed favorably by local officials, but authorities forced its closure in the aftermath of the Feb. 5, 1997 Ghulja Incident—protests sparked by reports of the execution of 30 Uyghur independence activists that were violently suppressed by authorities, leaving nine dead, according to official media, though exile groups put the number at as many as 167.

After closing the foundation, authorities froze its assets and placed Halis Haji under supervision, he said, and the four men may have been accused of hiding the organization’s remaining money.

Beginning in April 2017, Uyghurs accused of harboring “strong religious views” and “politically incorrect” ideas have been jailed or detained in re-education camps throughout the XUAR, where members of the ethnic group have long complained of pervasive discrimination, religious repression, and cultural suppression under Chinese rule.

While Beijing initially denied the existence of re-education camps, the Uyghur chairman of Xinjiang’s provincial government, Shohrat Zakir, told China’s official Xinhua news agency last month that the facilities are an effective tool to protect the country from terrorism and provide vocational training for Uyghurs.

Reporting by RFA’s Uyghur Service and other media organizations, however, has shown that those in the camps are detained against their will and subjected to political indoctrination, routinely face rough treatment at the hands of their overseers, and endure poor diets and unhygienic conditions in the often overcrowded facilities.

This week in Geneva, China is likely to face a grilling on the Uyghur camps from some Western countries at the United Nations Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of its human rights record.

Adrian Zenz, a lecturer in social research methods at the Germany-based European School of Culture and Theology, has said that some 1.1 million people are or have been detained in the camps—equating to 10 to 11 percent of the adult Muslim population of the XUAR.

Reported by Shohret Hoshur for RFA’s Uyghur Service. Translated by RFA’s Uyghur Service. Written in English by Joshua Lipes.

China’s human rights abuses are going unpunished – its financial power means the world keeps looking away

China has been touted as a welcome, benevolent financier in Africa, but its growing economic influence has troubling effects

Chinese president Xi Jinping, centre, with South Africa's Cyril Ramaphosa, centre left, and other leaders behind, attend the 2018 Beijing FOCAC summit

Chinese president Xi Jinping, centre, with South Africa’s Cyril Ramaphosa, centre left, and other leaders behind, attend the 2018 Beijing FOCAC summit ( AP )

With the brutal murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi fresh in the mind, the appetite of the global community for holding countries to account on human rights abuse appears to be increasing. Not only are world leaders joining in criticism where abuses are exposed, but ordinary citizens seem to have been galvanised to take action too. Though limited, and late, this change in attitude is welcome.

But what of the other countries still benefiting from their own covert abuses that target communities that the west is still turning a blind eye to? Countries such as China, which, through its ever-expanding financial power, has managed to throw a great deal of the world off the scent of its relentless oppression of various communities at home (the plight of Uyghur Muslims, in particular), as well as abroad.

Take China’s Belt and Road project throughout Africa as an example of its new global influence: the ambitious endeavour has seen the nation expand its influence exponentially in countries including Zambia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya and South Africa, through huge investment in this major infrastructure scheme.

China has been touted as a welcome, benevolent financier in Africa, with the added bonus of providing infrastructure support and peace-keeping assistance – even where past evidence suggests the contracts drawn up to facilitate this support have a troubling legacy for local people.

In September, at a Beijing summit with African leaders, Xi Jinping pledged $60bn (£47bn) for endeavours in Africa in addition to its 2015 promise of $60bn, to be delivered in the form of investment and loans, as a means of “bettering lives” for locals, and putting “more emphasis on the environment and resources”. China has, during this time, also become increasingly involved in UN Peacekeeping operations, offering training for police officers and military assistance in a number of African nations.

This level of intervention should be raising global questions about how power is used and where it is abused. But those questions are not forthcoming.

There are lots of reasons to be worried about China’s conduct on the world stage. Just this week, the country opened its 13th police station in South Africa’s Port Elizabeth, an initiative that the provincial commissioner, lieutenant general Liziwe Ntshinga referred to as “noble”. But South Africans who believe the partnership is built on corruption and a growing debt burden (as evidenced in Angola, a nation China has also consistently provided with aid and one which has an appalling track record when it comes to reproductive rights, abuses by security and political violence) think otherwise.

In Kenya, a wave of Chinese management brought to light racist abuse against Kenyans in the workplace, with examples of bosses referring to black people as monkeys, according to The New York Times.

The long arm of finance appears to be linked to Chinese enforcement, not only at home but now overseas. And China’s record at home should be of particular concern to anyone watching its influence spread across the globe. As Human Rights Watch consistently reports, Chinese law enforcement has seen to the surveillance and arbitrary detention of human rights defenders for years now. Forced confessions, brought about through physical as well as psychological torture, are known to be common interrogation tactics when it comes to law enforcement, with the Turkic Muslim Uyghur community one of the most severely targeted groups in the region.

Extremely invasive surveillance missions have targeted the community, ranging from the installation of QR codes on the homes of Uyghur Muslims to the legalisation of “vocational training centres” – understood by many in the west to be internment camps – that serve solely as a means of further persecuting the religious minority. It is estimated that up to one million Chinese Muslims are held in these camps today.

The abuses of world power, in the face of China’s financial influence, do not end at human lives, either. The Chinese cabinet has just reversed a 25-year-old ban on the use of rhinoceros horns and tiger bones in medicine – a move that the World Wildlife Fund said would have “devastating consequences globally”.

And yet, unlike elsewhere, nobody speaks up. China’s silent abuses are treated with a business-as-usual complacency.

When the world wakes up to the severity and consequences of its silence over China, the cries of injustice will be too little, too late.

https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/china-africa-finance-uyghur-muslims-human-rights-abuse-infrastructure-investment-a8610756.html?fbclid=IwAR1H712rsIgZlRizjB6IVa6kiBCGSJoQB5u4ZG4BsdUcTyY6FlJah4B8QCQ

Xi Jinping’s Genocide of the Uyghurs

Xi Jinping’s Genocide of the Uyghurs

Xi Jinping has somehow escapted attention for his role despite being the mastermind behind China’s cultural genocide of the Uyghur people.

Featuring 12 Myth-Busting Essays by Jeremy R. Hammond

It is now known to the world that the Uyghurs are going through one of the most horrific cultural genocidesof the 21st Century. The emerging testimonies from the victims of it, however fragmented they are, can point to a bigger picture that China, with a morally abhorrent and psychologically cold-blooded cruelty, are crushing the Uyghurs at all levels. Xi Jinping is the mastermind behind this genocide as the leader of China, and for the most part has somehow escaped the spotlight of international pressure and criticism, remaining a silent and unnoticed perpetuator of this genocide.

An increasing number of Uyghurs are being secretly transferred from the concentration camps in Xinjiang (also known as East Turkistan) to jails across China as a tactical move to erase the traces of the crime against humanity that Chinese authorities are committing. The recent satellite imaginary captured and analyzed by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) think tank is indicative of “the expansion of 28 detention camps that are part of a massive program of subjugation in the region of Xinjiang.” Hurriedly legitimizing the concentration camps into law, the Chinese government is defending them as a mechanism to change the culture of Uyghurs with the intent of making their lives more “colorful.” At first denied, then partially accepted and now praised by the Chinese authorities, the concentration camps are operating as a place of real horror as well as profound confusion—where does all this lead up to? With no prospect of returning these Uyghurs to their homes, there seems no opportunity for family reunification between parents, who are detained in the concentration camps, and their children. The lives of Uyghurs are, therefore, slowly but surely being destroyed in sadistic manner.

Genocide is both politically motivated and psychologically prepared. Politically, it aims to annihilate a race of people by negating their right to exist, to determine their destiny, and to re-establish themselves in future generations. This is achieved through aspirations being obliterated, fundamental life-sustaining resources destroyed, widespread cruelty justified, and inalienable human rights denied. Horrifyingly, everybody in the dominant society is mobilized to take part in the genocide to mercilessly and “heroically” slaughter the dehumanized enemy. It becomes the center of political will, action and resolution. It is characterized as a historical necessity to bring a most troublesome and previously unsolved political problem to an end. Sometimes it is carried out in the name of patriotism, nationalism, or even humanitarianism.

Psychologically, genocide is one of the most complicated human behaviors to comprehend as it unleashes the otherwise hidden, dark and disturbing drives of aggression and rage on a massive scale. It obliterates the difference between good and evil morally and between normal and abnormal psychologically. Morally, it makes people inept and therefore blind to see the consequences of their actions. Psychologically, it then allows people to act sadistically and even inhumanly when they would otherwise never have acted in that way. The psychological concept of an intrinsic primal pack mentality within human beings generates a sense of social status and normalizes atrocities in the course of genocide inflicted upon others. This absolves the perpetuators of their personal and moral responsibility for their actions. The psychological motivation for genocide is driven by emotions of fear, anger, and hatred. It is the result of being desensitized, both psychosocially and morally, through long-term propaganda and brain-washing aimed at diminishing the intrinsic value of a human life. In genocide, an opportunity is provided for a person or group to release their deeply ingrained and largely unconscious aggression towards the targeted other who is vilified, feared, or hated. In it, the wholeness of human existence is reduced to the level of an animal or a plant to be despised, controlled, or eradicated.

In this context, the Uyghur cultural genocide can be perceived through these two lenses: political and psychological. On the political level, the establishment of the concentration camps aims to offer a final solution to the Uyghur issue in the restive Xinjiang region. This political solution, recently celebrated by some Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members as a guarantee of China’s stability and prosperity, has never been as resolute as it is currently. For Xi Jinping, this paves the way for the successful implementation of the mega-Eurasia project, the One Belt and One Road Initiative, to which the Uyghurs are perceived to be a threat. It is also a deliberate strategy to vacate more space in Xinjiang—in particular, southern Xinjiang—as a gateway to Central and West Asia. This accommodates the influx of Chinese immigrants assisted by Chinese authorities who have previously felt unsafe, to some extent, in a foreign, “backward” and often unwelcoming land as colonial settlers. Furthermore, it facilitates Chinese expansionism through trade incentives promised by the Initiative into Central Asia, further into the Middle East, and finally into Europe. The cultural genocide, therefore, is no longer solely an assimilationist policy of China to forcedly integrate Uyghurs into Chinese identity. It serves multiple political purposes and is a deliberate strategy to eradicate Uyghur identity altogether and, resultantly, to establish “eternal peace” in Xinjiang and beyond at all costs.

On the psychological level, the cruelty expressed in this cultural genocide is terrible and terrifying. It is psychologically motivated being founded in the deep hatred of Chinese authorities and indoctrinated through propaganda into the Han Chinese towards the Uyghurs. This hatred has been opportunistically manifested from the growing anti-Islamic tendencies both inside and outside China after the tragic terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in the US. The Uyghurs, who are predominantly Muslims, have been victims of these tendencies. It has been deliberately exaggerated and exacerbated through state media and social media as a response to such Uyghur-related incidents in Urumqi, Kunming, and Tiananmen in recent years.

On the media coverage of these incidents and on a variety of discussion forums, the Uyghurs have repeatedly been vilified as terrorists and savages. The causality of these incidents has never been addressed transparently and genuinely by Chinese authorities. Instead, the authorities have utilized these incidents to justify harsher and more radical measures to suppress the Uyghurs with no intent of reconciliation. In playing on the insecurities of the Han Chinese in the context of a global threat of terrorism, Chinese authorities have developed mutual blame against the perceived Uyghur enemies into fear and hatred. The intensity of insecurities is heightened further by tacitly localizing the perceived threat within the Han Chinese population from the Uyghurs as enemies by the state under the pretext of fight against three evils (separatism, religious extremism and terrorism). This has created a disproportionate Chinese hatred towards Uyghurs who have never been able to express their discontentment with the political status quo. In the end, both parties fell into a spiraling trap of deteriorating their relationship where only mistrust and hostility exist. The Chinese state media has successfully created a “monster” in the closet needing to be eliminated for the peace of mind of the people. The Chinese people are, therefore, psychologically prepared for accepting anticipatorily and perpetrating any type of atrocities to eliminate the Uyghurs who perceivably are threatening their peace. Genocide is justified.

The ineffective and uncoordinated international reaction to mass killings of Muslims and non-Muslims in Syria and the Rohingya genocide has encouraged China to consider eliminating the Uyghurs as a real possibility. By exploiting widespread international anti-Islamic sentiments, the authorities have portrayed the Uyghurs as part of global terrorism networks. They have exaggerated threats from the alleged, and indeed shadowy, organization called “The Turkistan Islamic Party” formerly known as the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and other names. Inside China, the Uyghur genocide is committed in a progressive way.

The first stage was in the form of the “Strike Hard” campaign, where Uyghurs were forced into a surveillance state by Chinese authorities exclusively targeting religious and cultural contents in cell phones and computers of the Uyghurs allegedly related to terrorism and separatism deemed dangerous for social stability and security. This campaign was launched as a swift response to the ethnic violence within the capital city of Xinjiang, Urumqi, on July 5, 2009.  In 2014, the campaign was re-intensified as a zero-tolerance policy of any dissonance to the authorities aiming to eliminate any threat or resistance, resulting in mass arrests of Uyghurs in an extrajudicial way.

The second stage is cultural genocide through supposed re-education that attempts to force Uyghurs to denounce their own cultural identity and adopt Han Chinese culture. This stage is manifested in a way, in which authorities have determined to re-engineer the psyche of the Uyghurs through indoctrination while systematically destroying their belief systems.  This then eliminates their linguistic rights and prohibits their cultural practices. The third stage highlights China’s pervasive attempts to rapidly expand “re-education” camps in preparation for a massive physical genocide behind closed doors. Widespread use of torture inside the concentration camps is a testimony to the real intention of the authorities—it is not the temporary “reprogramming” of the Uyghurs mind, but the permanent elimination of Uyghur existence in the end.  Furthermore, the lack of globally coordinated efforts of world leaders, governments and human rights organizations to put pressure on China to stop the Uyghur abuses are sadly making the reality of physical genocide more likely than ever.  At each stage, Chinese authorities have carefully monitored international reactions to its action, in particular, the reaction of the US, UN and key human rights organizations. China’s response to any international criticism is portraying themselves as the victim of terrorism. The Chinese government is further blaming the Western media and governments for applying “double standards” to its efforts to fight against “Uyghur terrorists.” Presented in the form of victim mentality, this blaming tactic intends to achieve two goals: to justify its crime against humanity by usurping anti-terrorism policies of the West, and to put more pressure on the international community to be silent over the Uyghur genocide.

All these factors have contributed to China’s unfortunate successful implementation of their continued genocide of the Uyghur people. However, the missing piece in this puzzle is what role Xi has played in this cultural genocide. In the literature of China’s concentration camps, his name is barely mentioned. He has not openly made a statement about the position of the Chinese government on this matter. The sanctions that US lawmakers are pushing for through The Magnitsky Act against “senior Chinese Government and Communist Party officials who oversee these repressive policies, including XUAR [Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region] Party Secretary Chen Quanguo” do not include the name of Xi Jinping. The Uyghurs in diaspora also consider Chen as a main perpetrator of the Uyghur abuses. Once again, the name of Xi Jinping escapes the focus of attention, as if everything were running its own course independently of his leadership, guidance and approval. And yet, without the instruction and knowledge of Xi, nothing happens in China. Not even a small political move or decision, let alone the gradual and systematic elimination of an entire population—the Uyghurs. Is the absence of the name of Xi on the list of the perpetrators of the Uyghur genocide a collective memory lapse at all levels internationally? Or, is he so powerful to avoid any public attention paid to his masterminding of such a horrific crime? How could Chen Quanguo, however merciless he was in Tibet previously and in Xinjiang now, be able to undertake such a vast-scale and organized murder without the knowledge, instruction and approval of Xi?

Historically speaking, most of the perpetuators of genocide, e.g., Hitler, Mao Zedong, and Stalin in the 20th Century, have something in common. They all had deep hatred (however misguided and biased) towards another group, people or nation who became victims of the atrocities ordered to be inflicted. In addition, they were all good at communicating this hatred among their followers in an astonishingly effective way. All these perpetuators were dictators who not only singlehandedly commanded the bureaucracy of the state, but also instilled the sentimentalities of hatred within their people. More importantly, they diligently crafted a political cult of personality in their country where they were idealized to be an invincible, caring and worshipful leader.

Furthermore, these perpetuators provided a (theoretical) explanation for the extermination of the victims of the genocide. Hitler tried in his Mein Kampf to elaborate on his sinister anti-Semitic views through using the perspectives of Social Darwinism, resulting in the murder of six million Jews in concentration camps in Europe. Mao Zedong established ideological unity through mass propaganda, political purges and grass roots populist campaigns. Congruently, he envisioned the Great Leap Forward to totally transform the country from an agrarian economy into a socialist society through rapid industrialization and collectivization, resulting in tens of millions of deaths during the Great Chinese Famine. Stalin, while strengthening the political power of the Politburo, purged some of the key members of the Soviet Communist Party, intellectuals and others for the purpose of isolating and eliminating the ideological enemies through the Gulag system. This system was based around class-alienation and counter-revolutionist theologies, portraying victims as socially dangerous, disruptive, suspicious, and other disloyal elements. This resulted in millions of deaths in a harsh and inhuman environment in Siberia and beyond. All these genocides are, in essence, ideologically driven, psychologically prepared and politically carried out by the respective head of state.

At first sight, Xi Jinping’s case seems different to all these, and he has calculatedly approached the Uyghur genocide quite differently with an unassuming silence. He has never documented any literary justification for the Uyghur genocide. He has not made any speech or written any treatise to defend and justify his position on the atrocities committed under his direct command, despite mounting international criticism. He has also deliberately remained silent and absent from shaping or changing the hearts and minds of the Chinese people who may seek to understand this genocide. More specifically, they may either take part in or bear witness to the massacring of the Uyghur people, and to the plight of Uyghur children who are deeply traumatized by the separation from their parents. In this corrosive silence of Xi, the genocide is unfolding in a highly organized and institutionalized way. The real perpetuator, Xi, is not seen or heard anywhere in the scene of the genocide. He is invisible and inaudible, and yet, his direct command of this genocide is all encompassing, albeit surreptitiously.

There is, however, some evidence of Xi’s command over the Uyghur genocide and hints that he made on how to deal with the Uyghur disobedience. An example of this is his speech on his rare tour to Kashgar in 2014, preceding a work conference that would decide the policies for the implementation of the Uyghur genocide. In his Kashgar speech, Xi demanded stringent action against the Uyghur unrest. This speech could be interpreted as veiled criticism of the failure of his predecessors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, to implement what is ultimately their common goal to end the Uyghur unrest: the Uyghur integration into Chinese culture through economic growth. While it is not something new that he demanded, there is noticeably a different approach in his speech. He used strict and subtle language that defined, anticipatorily, the higher purpose of suppression of the Uyghurs in the future in the name of fight against terrorism, “to give a crushing blow to the terrorist forces” (给暴力恐怖势力以毁灭性打击), published on Xinhua Net on 1 May 2014. He deliberately replaced the terminology of his predecessors, the “Strike Hard”, with a new terminology, “the crushing blow,” highlighting an increased level of intensity, depth, harshness and scope of the upcoming Uyghur genocide.

Therefore, the need had arisen for China to portray the Uyghurs more prominently like terrorists as a justification for elimination, being a dangerous threat to national security. Three events happened in chronological order in the lead up to the establishment of the concentration camps are worth considering. Firstly, a variety of sources, including China’s official sources, have confirmed that Uyghurs had travelled to South East Asian countries since 2013, where they moved further into Syria through Turkey on an alleged mission to be jihadists. Secondly, Xi’s important speech at second Central Work Forum on Xinjiang (第二次中央新疆工作座谈会) in 2014 to accomplish “the erosion of ethnic differences, the removal of obstacles to the free ‘mingling’ (jiaorong) of Chinese citizens and the forging of a shared national identity.” Thirdly, the sudden relaxation of the restrictions on the obtainment of passports for Uyghurs to go overseas in 2015.

The first and third event is actually the implementation of the second event, providing a golden opportunity for China to portray Uyghurs as part of the global terrorism networks operative in Syria and beyond. There was travel of a relatively small number of Uyghurs to Iraq and Syria, where such jihadist groups as Islamic State and al-Qaeda (AQ) were operative in 2013.  This was utilized as propaganda by the Chinese authorities, making an alleged link between global terrorism networks and rising incidents of Uyghur resistance against China. The question remains how China, as a police state monitoring everything with great intensity and precision, could allow thousands of the Uyghurs to be indoctrinated openly in China with hardline Islamic theories compelling Muslims to commit themselves to the call of jihad. Further to this, how could China allow these Uyghurs to cross its border into South Asian countries to join the terrorist forces in Syria? Aside from all these mysteries, the presence of Uyghurs in Syria serves as a pretext for Xi’s new anti-terrorism legislation and strategic shift to accelerate the genocide after 2014. This incorporated detaining “anybody travelling internationally who is a Muslim”, with a particular focus on a list of 26 sensitive countries, including Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and Turkey, where they were supposed to be influenced by radical Islamic thoughts. The Uyghurs were then successfully placed in the concentration camps under the bizarre allegation that they caught ideological viruses during their stay in at least one of these 26 countries. They were labeled as having allegedly deep and dangerous links with global terrorism networks and hence punished for harboring terrorism tendencies.

The puzzling question is this: How could Xi Jinping command China to commit cultural genocide of the Uyghur people, a horrendous crime against humanity, for which he is yet to be held accountable?

Without a doubt, Xi has expediently consolidated his power as the most powerful leader in China after Mao. His background as a “princeling”, son of a senior Chinese official, should not obscure his real strengths—his highly pragmatic mind, strong personality, cautionary moves and strategic endeavors to ascend to a top level where he simultaneously serves as the President, the leader of the CCP, and the commander-in-chief of the military. Comparatively, the similarities between Mao and Xi are more fundamental than their differences. Both of them share essential leadership qualities of strategic adaptability, psychological resilience, tactical shrewdness, inherent ruthlessness, and the pursuit of eternal fame. In particular, both of them are ruthless in eliminating their enemies. Mao eliminated Liu Shaoqi and removed Deng Xiaoping as hidden rivals under the pretext of ideological purges, whereas Xi eliminated Zhou Yongkang, Bo Xilai and now Meng Hongwei under the pretext of anti- corruption. Both of them are political idealists by vision, despite being highly pragmatic by nature. Mao led the Great Leap Forward movement to achieve an unrealistic goal of bringing about rapid industrialization and economic growth, whereas Xi put forward a grand plan of China’s Dream. More importantly, both of them are staunch Chinese nationalists, irrespective of their different orientation in the Communism ideology. Mao forged Chinese identity through socialist idealism, whereas Xi captured China’s growing power with the term “China’s rejuvenation” to legitimize further the CCP’s primacy, grandiosely signaling the end of The Century of Humiliation (百年国耻). Thoughts of both leaders are shrined in the CCP’s constitution and they are revered as great leaders.

However, there are two crucial differences between them, one is personality-based and the other is personal. Firstly, unlike Mao, Xi is deeply intolerant to divisions and differences. He is not the Machiavellian politician who knows how to subtly play the game of reaping the seeds of dissonance by turning one against the other to minimize the threat of the united. Instead, he seeks full dominance to avoid any discord. This desire is translated into his conscious efforts to bring back the legitimacy of the CCP, which is waning due to many factors. These include the tarnished image of the CCP as a result of the deep-rooted culture of corruption; political factionalism operative in almost all institutions; the political and economic influence of Western culture; and demands on a greater level of individual freedom and on deep social reforms for a free press, democracy, and the constitutional separation of powers. All of this, in the eyes of Xi, is a threat to the legitimacy of the CCP. At the political level, he is well aware of how the supposedly almighty Soviet Union collapsed overnight. This political trauma contributes to his obsession to take control over everything to avoid a similar sudden or pre-mediated disaster and can be seen that he is determined to stop China repeating the fatal downfall of its former ideal model—the Soviet Union. From his perception, only the concentration of power in his hands will enable him to achieve his ultimate goal through the tyrannical method of rulership for the sake of establishing everlasting unity within China: ideological unity through eliminating discord, difference and threat, national unity through homogenizing Chinese society, military unity through modernizing its capacity under the leadership of loyal commanders, and economic unity through putting the market under the control of the CCP.

Xi’s solution of the Uyghur issue is part of his ultimate goal of unity. Ideologically, Uyghurs will be “educated” thoroughly and forcedly to abandon any thoughts against the CCP interest. Culturally, inside and outside of the concentration camps, they will be forced to be Sinisized converting to Chinese identity through brainwashing enforced with torture, where required. Politically, any Uyghur dissent within their home and internationally will be eliminated through threatening and torturing of family members, and denying communication with family. Economically, their wealth and resources will be gradually confiscated and naturalized.

The second difference between Mao and Xi is related to his personal experience. The childhood of Xi was profoundly disturbed by the arrest of his father and death of his sister during the Cultural Revolution. In particular, his father’s punishment as a senior veteran Chinese communist forced him to be humiliated and he experienced hunger and homelessness, sleeping in a cave. He was working as a heavy manual worker in the age of 15 in 1969 in the small northern village of Liangjiahe in Yan’an, the symbolic heart of the CCP, according to official accounts. These events left deep trauma in him, though he later reflected on it in a more confident, reflective and reconciliatory way. Indeed, he emerged from the grips of this trauma gaining resilience and pragmatism. However, these events hardened his heart to be extremely calculative, unyielding, cautious, and merciless. Behind his tough, uncharming and forlorn face, there is residual and only partially-healed trauma in the form of insecurity that is deeply hidden. This insecurity manifests in the sense that he is extremely sensitive to any mockery or criticism of him. In 2017, Wang Jiangfeng was sentenced to two years for apparently making fun of him by labeling him with a nickname of “Xi Baozi” (steamed bun Xi) in private messages he sent to friends.

With this sensitivity to humiliation comes a deep sense of shame causing insecurity hidden within himself. It forces him to confront his own suffering in a ruthless and extremely painful way. Externalizing this ruthlessness upon others gives him a sense of self-relief from his own deeply ingrained insecurities psychologically referred to as transference. It is a way to escape from the pain always making itself felt in an unbearable way. Another derived product of this shame is his (known) perfectionism, being as harsh on himself as he is on others, in particular, on his enemies. He is deeply afraid of making any mistake because this is a sign of losing control over his external world, and, even more petrifying, could potentially disclose his weakness and vulnerability to others. Therefore, to survive the external uncertainties requires self-control and self-discipline to a level of being a perfectionist. Only perfectionism can save his face, preventing him from being ridiculed, defeated and eliminated as he experienced in his teenage years.

A provincial leader described Xi as “always very boring and forgettable. He didn’t want to get any kind of bad record.” He has a persona of an ordinary person: his speech is unimpressive; his mannerisms are not spectacular; his ideas are not charming; and he does not convey charisma. But there is something special about him: he is a man of enormous inner strength, discipline and determination. These qualities are manifested in his leadership skills. One of his favorite quotes from Confucius gives us some hints about how he perceives himself as a leader: “He who rules by virtue is like the Pole Star. It maintains its place, and the multitude of stars pay homage.” He fantasies himself at the center of attention. In his self-image, just as the Pole star is the brightest one, he perceives himself as the center of the political universe, the king of the Middle Kingdom. He enjoys a grand megalomaniac image of himself, only secretly.

This is the mastermind behind the cruel operations of the concentration camps. His resolution to attain his goal is as striking as his merciless approach to opponents. His perfectionism is displayed in his command and the resulting precise execution of his orders and in his way of keeping low profile in overcoming enormous challenges to his authority and personality. His resilience and determination within his personality compels him not to give up on any goal he sets. Therefore, he will not seem to surrender his goal of genocide of the Uyghurs in the midst of the growing international pressure, just as Mao Zedong, Hitler and Stalin did not relinquish their determination of genocide towards their opponents. Most importantly, like the other dictators, he is under the delusion that his genocide is self-justifiable as a response to the perceived Uyghur threat to the national security of China. From his perspective, his motive is transhistorical—nobody can blame him in the future for what he has done, including the genocide of the Uyghur people.

Xi’s vision of the Uyghur genocide is rather melancholy. He has not demonstrated any sign of clemency for the victims of his cruelty. For him, any clemency is a sign of weakness that reveals the abyss of insecurity that he takes pains to hide from the world. To achieve the unity of the discords, he is internally bound to display the integrity of his personality through his resilience and resistance, and any kind of compromise or forgiveness is a sign of weakness and therefore not an option. The more ruthless he becomes, the more secure, strong, and safe he feels within himself. He needs this cruelty to appease the harrowing sense of emptiness in his heart. The Uyghur genocide will allow him to look as fearless and invincible as a leader like Mao domestically and internationally, whom he secretly worships.

 

In China’s Xinjiang, surveillance is all pervasive

The sinister, surreal and absurd for journalists who want to report on what’s happening in China’s far western region of Estturkestan/Xinjiang.

by

Urumqi, China – There are few more difficult places for a foreign journalist to report from in China than Estturkestan/Xinjiang.

Especially now.

Security has been bolstered amid a new campaign, which the government says is aimed at eradicating “Islamic extremism” in a province where more than half the population is Muslim.

Two weeks ago state TV aired pictures of what were described as vocational schools showing Muslim men and women being taught language and job skills. Most were Uighur, a Turkic-language people who are ethnically distinct from the Han Chinese.

China’s leaders argue harsh measures are needed to prevent violence associated with Uighur separatism; violence that, they say, has claimed the lives of hundreds of Chinese people in the past decade.

Uighur security personnel patrol near the Id Gah Mosque in Kashgar in Estturkestan/Xinjiang in this 2017 photo [Ng Han Guan/AP]

Human rights groups say the schools are, in fact, a vast network of re-education camps where detainees are held indefinitely without charge and forced to denounce their faith and recite Communist Party propaganda.

The Economist magazine recently described Estturkestan/Xinjiang as “the perfect police state”.

During a brief visit there two weeks ago I saw nothing to dispel that view.

‘Kill, kill, kill’

The surveillance is all pervasive. Streets bristle with CCTV cameras. In some cities, there are now police posts every 30 metres.

Since I was last there three years ago, there’s a new addition to the vast security network of police and elite special forces; a motley collection of shopkeepers armed with wooden sticks who have been trained in security measures. Twice a day outside their premises they rehearse their defensive drills, sometimes shouting, “Kill, kill, kill.”

In 2015, it was still possible to talk to local people, albeit discreetly. Not now.

For a Uighur to talk to a foreign journalist is to risk arrest. By coincidence, one of the Public Security Bureau officers assigned to tail us – Michael – had been my minder during my previous visit. And this time he wasn’t going to let the Al Jazeera team out of his sight.

He was there to welcome us back as we were attempting to check into a hotel, where I had stayed on previous visits.

The sheepish staff at reception told me my booking had been cancelled on the orders of the local government. A resigned shrug of the shoulders. There was nothing they could do.

Instead, we were offered rooms in a government-owned hotel, where uniformed and plain-clothed police lounge in the sprawling lobby.

Sinister, surreal, absurd

Xinjiang today is both sinister and surreal, but occasionally the absurd makes an appearance. The ringtone on Michael’s phone plays George Michael’s I’m Never Gonna Dance Again. George Michael became the soundtrack of our brief stay in Kashgar, because his phone never stopped ringing.

Filming and reporting in Estturkestan/Xinjiang have always been tightly controlled. But it’s in overdrive now.

I was forced to delete countless pictures surreptitiously recorded on my iPhone. One showed a security checkpoint, another a padlocked Uighur shop.

In a near-deserted market, a giddy trio from local TV turned up. The reporter – like Michael – was also a Uighur. She wanted to interview me about my impressions of Kashgar. I declined.

If I had told the truth our visit might have come to an even swifter end than it did. Undeterred, the TV crew tagged along, meaning our group had now grown to 10, decreasing still further any hopes of talking to someone – anyone.

One question hangs in the crisp autumn air: where are all the young men? China’s government is, at last, providing some of the answers. After denying the existence of internment camps, state-controlled media now proudly defend the policy; a policy that by many accounts is now being expanded.

Kashgar, closer to Baghdad than it is to Beijing, is the largest Uighur city and is said to have four camps holding 120,000 people. The largest is reportedly in Number 5 Middle School, but I would not get to glimpse even the outside of that school. According to Michael, such camps don’t exist in Kashgar.

‘Love the Party’

Instead of a re-education camp, we were shown the outside of the Id Gah mosque, the biggest in China. There’s been a mosque on this site for more than 600 years. Part of its facade is now peeling.

For the mostly Chinese visitors, the mosque is just another tourist attraction. In the recessed entrance, armed security guards sit beneath a red banner exhorting worshippers too, “Love the Party, love the country.”

On a wall opposite the mosque, looped images of President Xi Jinping, taken during his trip to Xinjiang in 2014, are projected onto a giant screen. One shows him surrounded by a group of smiling Uighur children.

It was shortly after this trip that more than 40 people were killed during a bombing and knife attack in the provincial capital, Urumqi. The government blamed Uighur separatists, and the crackdown began.

The ancient part of Kashgar remains closed. It was apparently being rebuilt, just as it was the last time I was here in October 2015. Instead, we were taken to a faux version of the Old City, complete with cultural performances reflecting distant – as opposed to recent – Uighur history.

It was just after my colleague had taken the classic metaphorical image of a caged bird that the mood of our hosts started to change.

‘Whose side are you on?’

They suspected – rightly – that we weren’t buying into the sanitised narrative. In a small local cafe, where we had stopped for a break, a particularly hostile female official from the local propaganda department demanded to look at everything we had so far filmed.

She turned her ire on my Chinese colleague. “Whose side are you on?” she yelled.

At first, we refused her demand. By now there were 15 uniformed and plain-clothed policemen crammed into the tiny cafe. Playing to the gallery, Ms Yang announced loudly: “We need to keep them in Kashgar for further investigation.”

The implication was clear. We would not be allowed to leave unless our material was vetted. At times like this, my immediate concern is for my Chinese colleagues. I have a foreign passport. They don’t and have no protection.

We were held for two hours, during which time they inspected every frame we had shot. They managed to ensure our deleted files could not be recovered. It had been a good day for Kashgar’s propaganda department.

The surveillance started even before I had left Beijing.

As an accredited journalist, my name had been flagged the moment I checked in for the flight to Urumqi. Four-and-a-half hours later plain-clothed police were waiting for me in the arrivals hall. Given I appeared to be the only non-Asian face I wouldn’t have been hard to spot.

An hour later the same men appeared in the lobby of my hotel. One even took the room next to mine, presumably to see if I attempted to interview anyone there.

At first, they stopped us filming innocuous street scenes. They later relented, but only permitted filming in their presence. “Do not talk to anyone,” we were repeatedly warned.

Security officers favour casual street style with ironic flourishes. My favourite: “Leave Me Alone.”

There was no chance of the Al Jazeera team being left alone in Estturkestan/Xinjiang. In the Kashgar hotel, there were at least 20 officers in the lobby, there for just one reason: us.

Surveillance state

Official figures show China’s surveillance budget now outstrips the amount spent on defence. I wondered what the cost to Chinese taxpayers had been of the operation to monitor three journalists.

Ordinary Uighurs spend much of their life lining up. Outside Urumqi’s international bazaar, Uighurs and Han Chinese lined up at separate security checkpoints. Uighurs are searched more thoroughly. Naturally, we weren’t allowed to film any of that.

Unlike my previous visit, we also weren’t allowed to film inside a Uighur home. If so, I might have seen if it was true that all knives now have to be chained to walls.

Xinjiang is at the heart of one of President Xi Jinping’s signature economic policies; the One Belt, One Road initiative. The plan envisages revitalising the fabled Silk Road trading routes to link China to Europe and the Middle East through vast infrastructure projects.

But for that ambitious plan to work, Estturkestan/Xinjiang has to work.

China’s leaders say Uighurs are benefiting from poverty eradication programmes. On October 24, the People’s Daily reported more than $6bn had been spent on improving the lives of almost two million Uighurs.

But that is still a drop in the ocean compared with what the government is spending on security and surveillance in Xinjiang.

And something else is clearly apparent.

Xinjiang has become another area that is now all but off limits to foreign journalists.

Under-reported: The treatment of Uighur Muslims in Xi's China

THE LISTENING POST

Under-reported: The treatment of Uighur Muslims in Xi’s China

SOURCE: AL JAZEERA


ABOUT THE AUTHOR


Xitay Hökümiti “Xitayning Kishilik Hoquq Weziyitini Qerellik Körüp Chiqish Yighini” da Jiddiy So’allargha Duch Keldi

2018-11-06

Un Flag

Birleshken döletler teshkilatida échilghan xitayning kishilik hoquq xatirisini “Qerellik körüp chiqish” yighinida xitay wekiliri shiddet bilen tenqitlendi.

2018-Yili 6-noyabir, jenwe.

 AP

6-Noyabir küni, xelq’ara kishilik hoquq organliri we dunya Uyghur qurultiyi qatarliq Uyghur teshkilatliri uzundin béri kütken xitayning kishilik hoquq weziyitini qerellik körüp chiqish yighini échildi. Bu yighinning kün tertipige asasen, aldi bilen xitay hökümitining wekiller ömikige söz bérilidighan bolup, ular xitayning kishilik hoquqining tereqqiyat ehwalini chüshendürüp ötkendin kéyin andin nöwet bilen herqaysi döletler özlirige bérilgen 45 sékunt waqit ichide özlirining bahalirini we tekliplirini oqup ötti. Bu jeryanda xitay wekiller ömiki yene herqaysi döletler wekilliridin chüshken pikir-tekliplerge jawab qayturdi.

Uyghur élide bir milyondin oshuq Uyghurning xitay hökümiti teripidin lagérgha qamalghanliqi ashkarilan’ghan bir mezgilde bu yighinning échilishi xitayni lagér mesiliside izahat bérishke qistaydighan yaxshi purset dep qarighan kishilik hoquq organliri we Uyghur teshkilatliri özlirining bu organ’gha sun’ghan doklatlirida lagérlar heqqidiki ishenchlik melumatlarni teminligen we herqaysi döletlerni xitaygha bésim ishlitishke chaqirghan idi.

Derweqe bügünki yighinda gherb démokratik elliri birdek Uyghurlarning kishilik hoquq weziyitini tilgha aldi. Amérika, kanada, bélgiye, chéx, firansiye, gérmaniye, islandiye, irélandiye, gollandiye, shiwéyitsariye, norwégiye qatarliq döletler xitay hökümitining Uyghur élide lagérlarni yolgha qoyup, Uyghur musulmanliri we bashqa musulman xelqlerni qamawatqanliqini bildürdi we birleshken döletler teshkilatining bu heqte tekshürüsh élip bérishini telep qildi.

Amérika wekili lagér mesilisini keskin halda otturigha qoyup, Uyghur rayonida az dégende bir milyon kishining lagérda tutup turuluwatqanliqini bildürdi. U sözide: “Xitay hökümitining shinjang Uyghur aptonom rayonidiki Uyghurlar, qazaqlar we bashqa musulman xelqler üstidiki basturushining éship bériwatqanliqi bizning qattiq diqqitimizni qozghimaqta. Biz xitay hökümitidin shinjang Uyghur aptonom rayonida yolgha qoyghan tutqun qilish lagérliri qatarliq barliq qanunsiz tutqun qilish wasitilirini derhal axirlashturushqa we yüz minglighan hetta milyonlarche tutqunlarni derhal qoyup bérishke chaqirimiz”, dédi.

Amérika yene xitay hökümitining tashqi wangchuk, ilham toxti qatarliq qamaqtiki kishilik hoquq pa’aliyetchilirinimu qoyup bérishi kéreklikini eskertti we xitayni din’gha ishen’güchilerning hoquqlirigha kapaletlik qilishqa chaqirdi.

Shiwétsariye wekili sözide: “Biz xitay hökümitini shinjang Uyghur aptonom rayonidiki barliq qayta terbiye lagérlirini derhal taqashqa chaqirimiz, shundaqla kishilik hoquq aliy komissarliqining alahide xadimlirini rayon’gha bérishqa chaqirimiz”, dédi.

Firansiye wekili sözide: “Biz xitayni 18-awghust küni échilghan irqiy ayrimichiliqqa qarshi turush yighinida shinjang heqqide bérilgen tekliplerni ijra qilishqa, bolupmu u yerdiki yighiwélish lagérlirini derhal ayaghlashturushqa dewet qilimiz. Xitay hökümiti shinjang we tibettiki xelqlerning dini erkinlikige kapaletlik qilishi kérek”, dégenlerni bayan qildi.

Islandiye we irélandiye wekilliri özlirining Uyghurlarning yighiwélish lagérigha qamalghanliqi heqqidiki xewerlerdin qattiq endishe qilghanliqini ipade qilip, xitay hökümitining musteqil tekshürgüchilerning bu mesile üstidin tekshürüsh élip bérishigha maslishishi kéreklikini bildürdi.

Yighinda, en’gliye, awstraliye, awstriye, daniye, finlandiye, shiwétsiye we yaponiye qatarliq döletler xitay hökümitining Uyghurlarning kishilik hoquqi, jümlidin dini we milliy hoquqlirigha hörmet qilishi kéreklikini eskertti.

En’gliye wekili sözide: “En’gliye xitayning tereqqiyat hoquqi we ölüm jazalirini azaytishtiki tirishchanliqini qarshi alidu, biraq xitayda yighilish erkinliki, pikir erkinliki we étiqad erkinliki qatarliq puqraliq hoquqi we siyasiy hoquqlar künsayin chékinmekte. Bolupmu biz, xitay hökümitining Uyghurlar we tibetlerge tutqan mu’amilisidin endishe hés qilmaqtimiz”, dédi. U, xitaygha bergen teklipide, xitay hökümitidin Uyghur rayoni heqqidiki tekliplerge emel qilip, b d t alahide tekshürgüchilirining rayon’gha bérip tekshürüshige yol qoyushni telep qildi.

Finlandiye wekilimu xitay hökümitini musteqil tekshürgüchilerning Uyghur rayonigha bérip tekshürüsh élip bérishigha yol qoyushini telep qildi.

Yaponiye wekili sözide, yaponiyening xitay hökümitining kishilik hoquq pa’aliyetchiliri we ziyaliylargha qaratqan basturush heriketlirining kücheytishige diqqet qiliwatqanliqini, Uyghurlar we tibetlerning kishilik hoquq weziyitiningmu özlirini qayghugha séliwatqanliqini eskertip, xitay hökümitini bu milletlerning hoquqigha kapaletlik qilishqa chaqirdi.

Bügünki yighinda birmu musulman döliti Uyghur mesilisini yaki Uyghur élidiki lagér mesilisini tilgha almidi. Eksiche, ularning bir qismi xitay hökümitining kishilik hoquqta qolgha keltürgen tereqqiyatlirini dawamlashturushigha tilekdashliq bildürdi.

Uyghurlar alahide diqqet qilidighan döletlerning biri bolghan türkiyening wekili sözide gerche Uyghurlar yaki lagér mesilisini ochuq tilgha almighan bolsimu, emma rayonda yolgha qoyuluwatqan siyasetler heqqide toxtilip, xitay hökümitining xitaydiki barliq kishiler, jümlidin perqliq medeniyetni, perqliq kimlikini qoghdap qalmaqchi boluwatqanlarnimu dawamliq qollishi kéreklikini bildürdi. Türkiye wekili sözide yene: “Xitay hökümitining radikalliqqa qarshi jiddiy heriketke ötüshini chüshinishke bolidu. Biraq, bu yerde qolliniliwatqan bezi usullar, mesilen kishilerning héchqandaq qanuniy asassiz halda tutqun qilinishi we ularning a’ililiridin mehrum qilinishigha oxshash weqeler endishimizni qozghimaqta. Shunga biz bu jehette xitay hökümitining kishilik hoquq xitabnamisini toluq kapaletke ige qilish yolida xelq’araliq organlar bilen hemkarlishishini teklip qilimiz” dédi.

Xitay wekiller özlirige chüshken pikir-tekliplerge qayturghan inkaslirida xitayda puqralarning, az sanliq milletlerning, din’gha ishen’güchi guruppilarning asasiy kishilik hoquqliri, jümlidin pikir qilish, yighilish we din’gha ishinish qatarliq erkinliklirining toluq kapaletke ige ikenlikini qayta-qayta tekitlesh bilen bir waqitta, yuqiridiki döletlerning Uyghur éli heqqide dégenlirini “Emeliyettin yiraq” dep otturigha qoydi. Xitay tashqi ishlar ministirliqining mu’awin ministiri li yüchéng sözide: “Biz bundaq siyasiy meqsetler chiqish qilin’ghan eyibleshlerni hergiz qobul qilmaymiz”, dédi.

U shundaqla sözide Uyghur rayonida térrorluq tehditining mewjutluqini ilgiri sürüp: “Muqimliq dégen intayin muhim. Térrorluqning aldini élish birinchi orun’gha qoyulushi kérek” dégenlerni éytti. Yene bir xitay wekil, Uyghur élidiki lagérlarning kespiy terbiyelesh orni ikenlikini, hetta bu orunlarni püttürgenlerge diplom bérilidighanliqini éytti. Bu yighin’gha yene ürümchi shehirige yéqinda bashliq qilip békitilgen yasin sidiqmu élip kélin’gen bolup, u xitay wekiller arisida söz qilip, özining millitining Uyghurluqini alahide eskertip ötkendin kéyin Uyghur rayonida bundaq terbiyelesh orunlirining intayin zörürlükini, 22 aydin buyan rayonda birmu weqe chiqip baqmighanliqini ilgiri sürüp, yuqiridiki döletlerning we herqaysi kishilik hoquq organlirining éytqanlirini yoqqa chiqirishqa urundi.irade